

	Italiano	English
Docente/Instructor	Mirella Damiani	Mirella Damiani
Titolo/Title	CORPORATE GOVERNANCE E ORGANIZZAZIONE D'IMPRESA: LE TEORIE DELL'IMPRESA	CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM ORGANIZATION: THE THEORIES OF THE FIRM
Contenuti/Contents (12 ore /12 hours)	<p>I confini dell'impresa. La scelta make or buy.</p> <p>Le diverse teorie dell'impresa</p> <p>La teoria dei costi di transazione: il contributo di Coase e Williamson</p> <p>I diritti di proprietà: il modello di Grossman Hart e Moore</p> <p>L'impresa come nesso di contratti contracts (Alchian Demsetz)</p> <p>L'impresa come sistema di incentivi: il contributo di Holmstrom e Milgrom e Roberts</p>	<p>The boundary of the firm: make or buy</p> <p>Transaction costs and rent seeking: the views of Coase and Williamson.</p> <p>The Property right approach, the Grossman-Hart-Moore contribution.</p> <p>The firms as nexus of contracts (Alchian Demsetz)</p> <p>The firm as an incentive system, the contribution of Holmstrom and Milgrom and Roberts.</p>
Testi/Reading list	<p>Coase R. H. (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", <i>Economica</i>, vol. 4, n. 6, pp. 386-405</p> <p>Gibbons, R. (2005), "Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?", <i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</i>, vol. 58, n.2, pp 200-245.</p> <p>Grossman S.J. e Hart O.D. (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", <i>The Journal of Political Economy</i>, vol. 94, n. 4, pp. 691-719.</p> <p>Holmstrom B. e Milgrom P. (1994), "The Firm as an Incentive System", <i>American Economic Review</i>, vol. 84, n. 4, pp. 972-991.</p> <p>Rajan R.G., Zingales L. (1998), "Power in a Theory of the Firm", <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>, Vol. 113, n. 2, pp. 387-432.</p> <p>Williamson O. (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", <i>Journal of Law and Economics</i>, vol. 22, n. 2, pp. 233-261</p> <p>Damiani, M. (2006), Corporate Governance, Carocci</p>	<p>Coase R. H. (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", <i>Economica</i>, vol. 4, n. 6, pp. 386-405</p> <p>Gibbons, R. (2005), "Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?", <i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</i>, vol. 58, n.2, pp 200-245.</p> <p>Grossman S.J. e Hart O.D. (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", <i>The Journal of Political Economy</i>, vol. 94, n. 4, pp. 691-719.</p> <p>Holmstrom B. e Milgrom P. (1994), "The Firm as an Incentive System", <i>American Economic Review</i>, vol. 84, n. 4, pp. 972-991.</p> <p>Rajan R.G., Zingales L. (1998), "Power in a Theory of the Firm", <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>, Vol. 113, n. 2, pp. 387-432.</p> <p>Williamson O. (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", <i>Journal of Law and Economics</i>, vol. 22, n. 2, pp. 233-261</p> <p>Damiani, M. (2006), Corporate Governance, Carocci.</p>
Mese/Month*:	3-6 Febbraio	February 3-6