**Scheda insegnamento**

**Corporate governance e teorie dell’impresa / Corporate governance and the theories of the firm**

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|  | **Italiano** | **English** |
| **Docente/Instructor**  | Mirella Damiani | Mirella Damiani |
| **Titolo/Title**  | Teorie dell’impresa e corporate governance e organizzazione d’impresa:  | Corporate governance and firm organization: the theories of the firm |
| **Contenuti/Contents** | I confini dell’impresa. La scelta make or buy. Le diverse teorie dell’impresa La teoria dei costi di transazione: il contributo di Coase e Williamson I diritti di proprietà : il modello di Grossman Hart e Moore L’impresa come nesso di contratti contracts (Alchian Demsetz) L’impresa come sistema di incentivi:il contributo di Holmstrom e Milgrom e Roberts  | The boundary of the firm: make or buy Transaction costs and rent seeking: the views of Coase and Williamson. The Property right approach, the Grossman-Hart-Moore contribution. The firms as nexus of contracts (Alchian Demsetz) The firm as an incentive system, the contribution of Holmstrom and Milgrom and Roberts.  |
| **Metodologia/Method** | * Analisi teorica
* Discussione di papers
* Discussioni in classe o realizzazione lavori individuali
 | * Theoretical analysis
* Discussion of scientific papers
* In class discussion or individual assignments
 |
| **N. Ore/ N. hours** | **9** | **9** |
| **Mese/Month\*** | **Aprile/Giugno** | **April/June** |
| **Curriculum** | - QME; E&I; E&B | - QME; E&I; E&B |
| **Testi di riferimento/ Suggested readings** | *B Coase R. H. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, vol. 4, n. 6, pp. 386- 405* *Gibbons, R. (2005), “Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?”, Journal of Economic Behavior &* *Organization****,*** *vol. 58, n.2, pp 200–245. Grossman S.J. e Hart O.D. (1986), “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”, The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, n. 4, pp. 691-719. Holmstrom B. e Milgrom P. (1994), “The Firm as an Incentive System”, American* *Economic Review, vol. 84,* n. 4, pp. 972- 991. Rajan R.G., Zingales L. (1998), “Power in a Theory of the Firm”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 113, n. 2, pp. 387-432. Williamson O. (1979), “Transaction- Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations”, *Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 22, n. 2, pp. 233- 261* Damiani, M. (2006), Corporate Governance, Carocci  | *B Coase R. H. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, vol. 4, n. 6, pp. 386- 405* *Gibbons, R. (2005), “Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?”, Journal of Economic Behavior &* *Organization****,*** *vol. 58, n.2, pp 200–245. Grossman S.J. e Hart O.D. (1986), “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”, The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, n. 4, pp. 691-719. Holmstrom B. e Milgrom P. (1994), “The Firm as an Incentive System”, American* *Economic Review, vol. 84,* n. 4, pp. 972- 991. Rajan R.G., Zingales L. (1998), “Power in a Theory of the Firm”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 113, n. 2, pp. 387-432. Williamson O. (1979), “Transaction- Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations”, *Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 22, n. 2, pp. 233- 261* Damiani, M. (2006), Corporate Governance, Carocci  |

\* For details, please, refer to the calendar available at <http://dottorato.ec.unipg.it/it/>